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BOOK REVIEW
BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS, BY JERRY L. MASHAW. NEW HAVEN & LONDON: YALE
UNIVERSITY PRESS 1983.
Reviewed by Richard I. Greenberg·

I.

INTRODUCTION

The times do change. In the 1930's, an exciting group of aca
demics addressed the problems of unemployment and human need
and conceived an innovative national solution: The Social Security
Act of 1935.' Almost fifty years later the program still stands. How
ever, those giants of the 1930's are gone and we are left with a
changed program administered bya massive bureaucracy concerned
with consistency of administration and having no sense of mission or
vision as to what needs to be achieved.
In the 1960's and early 1970's, Yale Law School seemed to be
populated with exciting teachers and writers concerned with restor
ing mission and vision to the Social Security Administration. They
addressed a problem created by the Social Security Act and the mas
sive state and federal bureaucracy assembled to administer it. These
programs had created a class of citizens dependent on bureaucrats
they were powerless to influence. These Yale men conceived an in
novative solution to the problem based on the Constitution of the
United States. They transformed the unprotected "privilege" of re
ceiving government largesse into a constitutionally protected "right"
• Administrative Law Judge In Charge, Springfield, Massachusetts Field Office,
Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration. Adjunct Professor, Col
lege of Continuing Education and Graduate Studies, American International College.
B.A., Swarthmore College, 1966; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1969.
This review was written by Richard Greenberg in his private capacity. No official
support or endorsement by the Office of Hearings and Appeals of the Social Security
Administration, Department of Health and Human Services is intended or should be
inferred.
1. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 &: Supp. V 1981».
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to receive statutory entitlements: The New Property.2 This property
could not be withdrawn by the government without providing the
claimant an opportunity to hear the case against him and to present
opposing evidence and argument. 3 These rights supplemented the
statutory and regulatory procedural protections of the Administra
tive Procedure Act of 1946 (APA)4 and the right to judicial review
included by the early drafters and administrators of the Social Se
curity Act. S
Now Jerry L. Mashaw, Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale Uni
versity, tells us this was all wrong. The important things are not im
aginative solutions to social problems or providing procedural
protections from arbitrary government action. The important thing
is consistency of administration or "bureaucratic rationality." He fa
vors a retreat from procedural due process and opposes legislative
reform because new programs produce, or at least do not reduce, the
problems of consistent administration.6
Mashaw suggests that the ordinary concerns of administrative
law are nearly irrelevant to the disability adjudication process. He
describes such concerns as the result of a "sure instinct for the capil
lary."7 In fact, he considers the APA and due process hearings a
threat to the ideal bureaucratic system:
Our individualistic and democratic ideals, embodied in courts and
legislatures, symbolically contradict the basic thrust of bureau
cratic rationality. The extemallegal order provides not only inad
equate remedies for bureaucracy's ills, but also symbols of justice
or legitimacy that challenge the basic premises of the bureaucratic
ideal.
Thus, looking at the administration of the disability program
2. Reich, The New Property 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
3. Id at 783-84 (footnote omitted).
4. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305,
3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1982).
5. As originally enacted, the statute required "fair hearings" in the state grant-in
aid programs. Social Security Act of 1935, § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620
(1935). The federal programs were amended in 1939 to provide for "[r)easonable notice
and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a hearing is held, [the
Board) shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse
its findings of fact and such decision." Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666,
§ 205(b), 53 Stat. 1360, 1368-69 (1939). The amendments also provided for subpoena, id
§ 205(d), 53 Stat. 1370, judicial review based on "substantial evidence," id § 205(2), and
the right to be represented, id. § 206, 53 Stat. 1372.
6. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABIL
ITY CLAIMS 183-93 (1983).
7. Id at 19.
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through the judicial symbols of the rule of law-due process hear
ings and judicial review-we might denounce SSA's [the Social
Security Administration's] attempts to manage the ALJ [adminis
trative law judge] corps as the destruction of the claimant's guar
antee of due process. If we took seriously the democratic
symbolism of meaningful public participation in the development
of administrative policy, we would decry the adoption of the grid
regulations over the objections of virtually all .the participants in
the rulemaking process, and perhaps urge the invalidation of the
regulations on that ground alone. We wOllld therefore lament
both the failure of SSA administrators to follow the lead of re
viewing courts and the failure of reviewing courts to take a more
aggressive stance in reshaping SSA administration in its own im
age, or some quasi-legislative image of participatory democracy.
I obviously believe that these external modes of "reform" are
wrongheaded. 8
Mashaw does not limit himself to the Social Security Adminis
tration's disability program. He believes this lawless example is a
model of how bureaucracies should be run.
What appeals to him about the Social Security Administration?
He is attracted by the unbridled discretion which horrified his fellow
Yale men of the 1960's: the interpretation of statutes by bureaucrats
without using APA procedures, the negligible inlluence on policy ex
erted by the administrative law judge corps, and the administrative
defiance ofjudicial attempts to change statutory interpretation or in
lluence administrative procedures. 9
"[B]ureaucratic rationality-at least as practiced by SSA in the
disability program-is a promising form of administrative justice. It
permits the effective pursuit of collective ends without inordinately
sacrificing individualistic or democratic ideals."lo
This statement is preposterous. The disability program has
threatened the good reputation of the Social Security Administration
by causing it to abandon the accepted principles of due process in an
attempt to make an unworkable program function. The text is a cat
alogue of the problems that a vague, poorly conceived statute can
cause even the best intentioned and most competent of bureaucra
cies. Instead of regretting the compromise of accepted principles of
administrative law and due process, Mashaw provides praise. He
recognizes that the result has been inconsistent, expensive, pro
8. Id at 222.
9. Compare Reich, supra note 2, wilh J.
10. J. MAsHAW, supra note 6, at 222.

MASHAW,

supra note 6, at 222.
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tracted and unsatisfactory claims adjudication, but insists that these
are minor flaws which can be cured by further reducing the role of
an independent appellate process.
The assumption is that a disciplined and expert bureaucracy can
make any program work no matter how faulty its enabling legisla
tion or underlying assumptions. Mashaw dismisses in a few short
sentences the two most needed reforms: subjecting the bureaucracy
to the norms of administrative law; and supplanting failed categori
cal programs with programs that are accurately targeted and ad
ministerable by fallible humans. Instead, he recommends testing of
a few minor reforms such as claimant interview during the reconsid
eration process, II claimant representation at government expense, 12
and greater use of professionals in the claims adjudication process in
the form of medical examinations and multiprofessional panels. 13
It is discouraging that such a careful analysis, which recognizes
and describes so many of the problems plaguing the Social Security
Act's Disability program, can still prescribe "solutions" which refine
and carry on the practices which have brought us to this near chaotic
state.
This is a dangerous work, a paean to the unleashed bureau
cracy. Thankfully the impenetrable prose of Bureaucratic Justice
will prevent it from having wide influence.
II.

THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

While the applicability of the rulemaking provisions of the APA
may be "only" the result of regulation 14 and the present provisions
for judicial review "merely" statutorylS,surely fourteen years after
Goldberg v. Kelly 16 it is unquestioned that the adjudication of gov
ernment benefits is subject to due process review.l' Mashaw grudg
ingly concedes this is so while clinging to Justice Black's dissent in
Goldberg .18 Mashaw suggests that despite multiple reaffirmations of
II. Id at 199.
12. Id at 200.
13. Id at 202-209. The first of these experiments has already been incorporated
into the statute. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(2) (West Supp. 1983).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1982) exempts matters "relating to ... benefits" from
formal rulemaking requirements, but 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971) directs that the Depart
ment of Health and Human Services use the APA procedures. National Welfare Rights
Org. v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981).
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
17. Id at 262.
18. Black believed that because the fourteenth amendment "came into being pri
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the Goldberg opinion since 1970,19 it should be reversed or at least
reinterpreted to minimize the process that is due. 20 Recent trends in
federal court actions in cases involving Social Security suggest that
in the view of the federal judiciary it is still the claimant who needs
protection from the agency and not vice versa. 21 Thus, it is unlikely
that the type of reform Mashaw advocates will be forthcoming in the
near future.
Nevertheless, there is merit in the position that the feeble at
tempts of the legal profession to bring ad hoc fairness to a program
whose underlying theory is irrational has produced an anarchy in
which claims are first adjudicated by a state agency on the basis of
internal rules22 not subjected to APA rule making,23 then reviewed
by administrative law judges on the basis of law and regulations in
terpreted independently by each judge, followed by sporadic, some
times ill-informed, judicial review of only a handful of cases;
occasionally without concern for the substantial evidence rule. 24
While this procedure is a form of anarchy, removing the legal pro
fession from the process of adjudication, even if it were constitution
ally possible, would not make things better.
Mr. Mashaw's concern regarding this anarchy in the program is
plainly justified. And, as Mashaw argues, the solution to such anar
marily to protect the Negroes from discrimination. . ." it was inappropriate to provide
its protections to the gratuity which welfare benefits represented. Id at 275 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
19. Mashaw notes that LEXIS produced 1900 citations to Goldberg in 1981. J.
MASHAW, supra note 6, at 4 n.IO.
20. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 4.
21. See Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cit. 1982); Day v. Schweiker, 685
F.2d 19 (2d Cit. 1982); Mental Health Ass'n. of Minn., 554 F. Supp. 157 (D. Minn. 1982).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(I) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). Neither the directives to the state agencies, nor the
state agency internal directives have been considered subject to the APA procedures. As
this has been recognized as a source of confusion within the disability adjudication pro
cess, an attempt has been made to give this material some legal effect by republication in
the Social Security Rulings. 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1983).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976 &: Supp. V 1981). The judicial review provision stipu
lates in part that:
The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evi
dence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Secretary
or a decision is rendered under subsection (b) of this section [entitlement to
benefits) which is adverse to an individual who was a party to the hearing
before the Secretary, because of failure of the claimant or such individual to
submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under subsection (a)
of this section [rulemaking authority), the court shall review only the question
of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations. . . .
Id
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chy is control of the bureaucracy by imposition of a heirarchial
structure. Mashaw's vision of the role of administrative law within
this structure, however, does not comport with traditional notions of
fairness and due process. It is submitted that imposition of a hier
archial structure would be best achieved if adjudication were based
upon published precedent. The decisions of the state agency should
be subject to adversarial, on the record hearings where the initial
decision would be defended by the deciding bureaucrat. The deci
sion of the presiding administrative law judge would be subject in
tum to the precedential rulings of the Appeals Council. The ulti
mate authority would be exercised through the publication of regula
tions by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services appointed by an elected President with the advice and con
sent of an elected legislature. Such a program would not cry out for
judicial redress of palpable injustice as does the present adjudication
process. Judges would accordingly be less pressured to bend the
substantial evidence rule or attracted to equitable intervention in the
internal affairs of the program. Mashaw's suggestion that the way to
solve the problem of uncertainty in the standards of adjudication is
to give the civil service managers additional discretion to issue rules
which will control the administrative law judges2S would seem to ap
peal only to managerial aspirations.
Mashaw's characterization of the appellate process as a "capil
lary" is based on his perception that the mass of cases are adjudi
cated without the inftuence of the appellate system. 26 This is no
longer factually true. The combination of increasing appeals and
high reversal rates have raised the percentage of cases receiving ben
efits as the result of appeal to measureable levels. 27 More impor
tantly, it would improve consistency of adjudication if the appellate
system exercised inftuence on cases beyond those actually reviewed
through published precedent.
Of course the present number of appeals and the bloated ad
ministrative law judge corps prevent effective function of a prece
dential appellate process, but there is no reason for the number of
claims now reaching the appellate level except that it has served to
J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at IS, 104, 145.
26. Id at 19.
27. While initial claims dropped almost twenty-two percent between fiscal year
1981 and 1982, the number of requests for bearing rose almost fourteen percent. DE
PARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY AOMIN., PuB. No. 70
032 (5-83), OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF HEARINGS ANO ApPEALS 18 (Sept.
30, 1982) (hereinafter cited as OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982).
25.
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justify the increasing agency resources devoted to the Office of Hear
ings and Appeals (OHA) to the great satisfaction of the bureaucratic
barons who rule the OHA fief. One year after the disability program
was originally enacted, thirty-five referees were able to handle the
6000 appeals generated throughout the country.28 Now over 800
judges are unable to handle 320,000 requests for hearing. 29 There
has been no comparable growth in the number of claims processed
by the Social Security Administration as a whole. 30 The engine for
this growth has not been the dictates of due process. The blame rests
with the lawless system of bureaucratic rationality advocated by
Mashaw. We have an appellate system without standards which en
courages appeal by generously rewarding litigiousness.
III.

THE VALID CRITIQUE-REvERSAL RATES

The demand for a restriction in the importance of the hearings
process is fueled by the unconscionable percentage of cases which
are awarded by administrative law judges on review, now in excess
of fifty-three percent. 31 Clearly these awards are not made on the
basis of the same standards used in the initial reviews. Even worse is
the variation in reversal rates among judges. Published statistics
show these rates vary from ten percent to ninety percent with sixty
six percent of the judges reversing more than half the cases before
them.32 These statistics understate the actual reversal rate since they
include as unfavorable determinations those cases dismissed on pro
cedural grounds. 33 It is this fact which leads the bureaucratic powers
within the administration (who are given courage by analyses such
28. H. HYDEN, TwENTY SIX YEARS OF OHA, (The OHA Newsletter, SSA Pub.
No. 7()..()4(), Nov. 1983).
29. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 18 & 21.
30. The number of monthly benefit awards during the period 1957 to 1981 went
from 178,802 to 345,254 with the peak reached in 1975 at 592,049. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., PuB. No. 13-11700, SOCIAL
SECURITY BULLETIN ANNUAL STATISTICAL SuPP., Table 52, at 109 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as the SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN of 1981). This understates the program growth
however since the SSI program was added in 1974. Nevertheless, it is evident that there
has not been a 1400% increase in the program population as a whole.
31. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982,supra note 27 at 19. A subcommittee on
Oversight of Governmental Management puts the reversal rate at 67.2% in mid 1982.
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVT'L
AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE II SOCIAL SE
CURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM, S. REp. No. III, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
32. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES REVERSAL RATES--DISABILITY.INSURANCE, 3
SOCIAL SECURITY FORUM 4-5 (1981).
33. Excluding the procedural dismissals raises the official reversal rate from 52.7%
to 58.4% for fiscal year 1982. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982 supra n.27, at 22.
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as Mashaw's) to be concerned about whether independent adminis
trative law judges are consistent with the purposes of the Act. The
judges have shown little inclination to discipline themselves in this
matter. Instead they tend to accept the characterization of the ad
ministration that their decisions are of little worth, representing at
best a step in the adjudication of an individual claim, having no final
authority and no context in the program at large.
The reason for the existence of this problem is not some subtle
failing in the way in which the decisionmaking process is structured
within the Social Security Administration or the inferior quality of
the individuals who make up the administrative law judge corps.
Accordingly, changes in how decisions are made or even who makes
them will not necessarily alter the ultimate result. High reversal
rates among administrative law judges have been tolerated until re
cent times not because Congress and the program administrators
lacked the imagination to make the adjustments needed to change
the situation, but because the high reversal rates were in fact desira
ble to sustain the political popularity of the Social Security pro
grams. The process assured the the spumed claimants did not form
the nucleus of popular dissatisfaction with the Social Security Act
and its programs.
The program is financed by taxes which represent thirteen per
cent of most workers wages. 34 Taxes are unpopular. Taxpayers
must be convinced that their taxes are not being squandered, hence
the demand for strict standards of eligibility. However, claimants
also vote and are intensely offended when their claims are denied. A
strategy of strict enforcement of standards can threaten the viability
of the program if taxpayers perceive that they are paying dearly fora
program that does not payoff when they are in need. This problem
has been avoided by never saying "no". The offended, denied claim
ant can always appeal and has only himself to blame if he does not
pursue his claim the full route. Since the time, effort and lack of
litigious prediliction cause the less aggrieved claimant to accept a
denial, the administration could afford to buy off a great deal of dis
satisfaction by paying a large proportion of appealed cases without a
proportionate increase in program costs. Program consistency suf
fered, but everyone went home happy.
This process worked well until recently when two factors led to
a demand for "reform" which is manifested in the Congressionally
34. For the current combined FICA rate for 1984, see Rates and Computation of
Employee Tax, I UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) , 10,216 (Nov. 3, 1983).
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mandated "Bellmon" review of judges with high reversal rates. 3S
These factors were the exponential growth in the public knowledge
of the easy fruits of appeal and the financial crises in the retirement
program.
The increasing public knowledge of the high reversal rates at
the administrative law judge level was also fueled by the fruits of
such appeals for the legal profession. These fruits were sufficiently
large to warrant front page coverage in The Wall Street Journal. 36
A further contributing factor to caseload growth has been the
adminstrative actions ostensibly designed to control the growing
backlog of appeals. These administrative actions included dispens
ing with the review of favorable administrative law judge deci
sions,31 increasing the number of judges,38 providing additional staff
and machinery necessary to processing ever larger numbers of cases
with less and less consideration39 and pressuring the administrative
law judges to decide more cases without ever asking that the quality
or correctness of the resulting product be considered.40 The result
35. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, § 304(g), Pub. L. No. 96-265,
94 Stat. 441 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421 note (Supp. V 1981». See also S. REP. No. 408,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 52-56, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1277, 1330
34. Congress may now be swinging in the other direction. A recent Senate subcommittee
report suggests that the emphasis on review of reversals by the administration was mis
placed. See supra note 31, at 9. The Association of Administrative Law Judges has filed
suit alleging that the administration's interpretation of the Bellmon Review has inter
fered with adjudicative independence. Association of Admin. Law Judges V. Heckler,
No. 83-124 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 1983).
36. Growth Industry--DisalJility Cases Under Social Security Are a Boon to Law·
yers, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1982, at I, col. 1.
37. In fiscal year 1982 after the Bellmon review was initiated, the Appeals Council
reviewed 12,000 "favorable" administrative law judge decisions as compared with 65,000
"unfavorable" actions. Social Security Disahility Reviews: The Role ofthe Administrative
Law Judge, Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on OverSight of Government Management,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1983) (testimony of Comm'r Louis B. Hays). The Office of
Hearings and Appeals, however, reports only 63,559 dispositions by the council in the
same period. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 26.
38. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 21.
39. Id.
40. The Administration brought an adverse action before the Merit Systems Pro
tection Board against an Administrative Judge whose only failing was not producing in
excess of twenty cases per month. The average administrative law judge produced about
nine decisions per month in 1965. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., Pub. No. 70-032 (6-80), OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE OF
FICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS, 33, 44 (Sept. 30, 1979) [hereinafter cited as OPERA
TIONAL ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 1979). Despite the recommendation of preSiding
administrative law judge, the Board declined to take adverse action, suggesting that the
Administration had failed demonstrate that the lack of numbers was equivalent to a lack
of diligent performance. SSA V. Goodman, No. HQ75218210015 (MSPB Feb. 6, 1984).
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has been mathematically predictable. More favorable decisions
meant greater public awareness, greater attorney awareness and
more appeals. It never bothered the administrators that their efforts
at backlog control were a consistent failure since the growth simply
increased the command of the fiefdom on ever greater resources.
The disability trust fund remained financially healthy. In fact, de
spite the profligacy of the administrative law judges, the number of
claimants on the disability roles has fallen steadily since 1977, and
the number of claims granted per month has fallen since 1975.41
These facts cannot be explained by the effect of the recent improving
economic climate or the review of eligibility pursuant to Congres
sional mandate. No one seriously argues the other possibility, that
the disastrous increases in private health insurance programs, Medi
caid and Medicare, have in fact had a positive impact on the health
of American workers.
The process affecting the Social Security Administration's pro
gram was paralleled and possibly abetted by developments in the
private sector. Despite Mashaw's belief that the private sector had
been driven from the disability arena,42 private policies providing
cash benefits in the event of disability proliferated along with Work
men's Compensation programs. The administration of these pro
grams is almost unbelievably lax, providing astronomic payouts
under the most questionable circumstances. Among the private in
surers there is even less pressure to deny claims since profits are
made not by a discrepancy between intake and payout but by invest
ing the proceeds pending payment: the higher the experience, the
higher the cash flow, the greater profits. These programs also depend
on the credibility of the expectation of payment. The mushrooming
expectations of what constitutes a compensable loss of capacity has
pervaded the factories and workplaces and has created changed ex
pectations of what is compensable under the Social Security Act.
This climate changed suddenly with the crises of the retirement
trust fund. The need for transfusions from the disability trust fund
(brought on by demographics, not lax administration or unruly ad
ministrative law judges) led to a bleeding of the disability trust fund
to support the retirement program. Left to its own devices, the ra
tional bureaucracy would have responded to the need for reduced
payments without difficulty. But hell hath no fury like the disability
claimant scorned. These claimants have an understandably high
41. SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN of 1981, supra note 30, Tables 52 & 60.
42. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 34.
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propensity to appea1. 43 In the judicial context these appeals have
great merit as the result of conscious or subconscious considerations
of res judicata. The courts, Congress and state governments have
reacted to affirm this precept despite bureaucratic disfavor thus frus
trating the attempt to control program expenditures. The acceptabil
ity of inconsistent adjudication has died not because it had interfered
with bureaucratic rationality, but because financial circumstances
have changed. The cause of these problems was not administrative
law, but the failure of bureaucratic rationality. High reversal rates
will not be cured by attempts to curb the judiciary, but by applying
administrative law. APA rulemaking procedures and precedential
decisonmaking are the keys to less arbitrary adjudications and thus
reducing the high propensity to appeal.
IV.

THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

Ultimately this debate about how the program should be ad
ministered is petty. It is naive to assume that either bringing the
discipline of classic administrative law to the Social Security Admin
istration or allowing the bureaucracy full discretion to create arbi
trary but administrable standards will solve the problems created by
the disability programs. It is not just inconsistent adjudication that
troubles the disability program, but also the inconsistency of the dis
ability program itself with generally understood ideas of fairness.
Even the most consistent program of adjudication will not remove
the public concern if evenhandedness still produces socially un
desireable results.
An understanding of the source of the disability program and
how it developed is an aid to understanding its current problems.
Mashaw does not discuss in detail the philosophical underpinnings
of the program or its history. He observes briefly:
[A] disability program was proposed in the original planning that
led to the Social Security Act of 1935, but no such program was
even haltingly begun until 1950, and it did not become a full
fledged early-retirement benefit scheme until 1960. Congressional
consideration consistently reveals a single dominant reason for re
luctance to rationalize the Social Security scheme by adding disa
bility benefits: moral hazard. Tlte disability program could easily
tum into a residual unemployment program. Intense applicant
pressure to expand the beneficiary class is to be expected in cycli
43.

OPERATIONAL REPORT.

Sept. 30. 1982. supra note 27. at 18.
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cal economic downturns. The program thus requires very tight
administration to maintain its integrity.
The experience of private disability insurance in the 1920's
suggested that adversarial adjudication was not such a system.
Several insurers were bankrupted by judicial expansion of their
policies' conception of the covered risk; and all private carriers
abandoned the field when judicial construction, in the face of ris
ing
unemployment,
made
disability
actuarially
unpredictable. . . .44

A slightly more detailed view of the program explains much
about its problems. First it is noted that the Social Security Act of
1935 was the result of intense concern with the results of the eco
nomic depression that had begun in 1929.45 Workers had lost their
jobs in great numbers as the result of economic conditions not weak
ness of character or body. Many had lost their life's savings as the
result of bank collapse or stock market losses or the decline in value
of investments. The incoming Roosevelt Administration addressed
itself first to providing jobs to the able-bodied through programs
such as the WPA and to providing federal monies to the state relief
programs to assist all who were in need. Having addressed those
problems, the next order of business was to create programs for the
longer term. These programs included not only the program of con
tributory retirement insurance which we now equate with Social Se
curity, but also the state-administered unemployment programs and
grants in aid of state programs to benefit the destitute elderly, depen
dent children and the blind. The latter programs had historic prece
dent and were considered non-controversial. Granting federal
money to assist state run aid to the aged programs was thus placed as
Title I to the bill to camouflage the more novel and controversial
national insurance program.46
Prominently missing from the original Act were programs deal
ing with health and disability. Workmens compensation plans had
44. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 34.
45. F. PERKINS, THE ROOTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 2 (The Beginnings of Social
Security, OA-OTC Pub. No. 88-72 (11-72».
An interesting early history of the Social Security Act is provided by a series of
pamphlets issued by the Social Security Administration bearing the title: The Beginnings
of Social Security. They represent speeches and interviews with the participants in the
task force which drafted and guided the passage of the Act.
46. E. CLAGUE, FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PASSAGE OF THE SOCIAL SECUR
ITY ACT 14 (The Beginnings of Social Security OA-OTC PuB. No. 086-72 (11-72».
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antedated the Act,47 providing limited liability to employers for inju
ries to workers in the course of employment.48 Health insurance was
actively considered by the drafters of the original act but was not
pursued because the vehement opposition of the American Medical
Association made the matter so controversial as to jeopardize the
other programs.49 Benefits for workers who became invalids prior to
retirement age were discussed but deferred along with benefits to
survivors and dependents. so It is not clear that anyone at that time
discussed a disability program as we know it today, ie. one provid
ing benefits to individuals of all ages regardless of past relation to the
labor market, based on a medically-established inability to perform
any type of work.
The federal government entered the fray of disability benefits in
1950 by adding a new category to the state granted-in-aid program. S1
The original categorical programs had been Aid to the Aged, Aid to
the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children. The new program sim
ply provided benefits to "individuals eighteen years of age or older
who are permanently and totally disabled. . . ."S2 It was up to the
states, with federal guidance, to fill in the details of who was covered
and how eligibility was established. It was thought that about
200,000 workers would be affected and not all states chose to be in
cluded. S3 The bill had provisions for benefits under the insurance
titles of the act as well, but these were not adopted.
In 1954, the first step in the federally administered disability
program were taken very much in the manner of private insurers,
not through the provision of cash benefits, but through waiver of
premium for retirement benefits. s4 A worker would normally re
ceive benefits from the program at age sixty-five only if he had paid
into the program for the requisite period of time. All that was ini
tially provided was that a worker, unable to maintain insured status
by reason of a medically determinable impairment of long and in
47. The first workmen's compensation statute was created by New York in 19\0.
B. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, EcONOMICS OF LABOR 695 (1961).
48. J. BROWN, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE I (The Begin
nings of Social Security) SS Pub. No. 85-72 (11-72».
49. T. ELIOT, THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 7 (The
Beginnings of Social Security OA-TCD Pub. No. 084-74).
50. E. CLAGUE, supra note 46, at 16.
51. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, Pub. L. No. 734, 64 Stat. 477 (1950)
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
53. H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1949).
54. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 761,68 Stat. \052 (1954)
(codified as amendment 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
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definite duration which prevented all substantial gainful activity,
would not lose eligibility for retirement benefits. His insured status
would be frozen thus preserving his eligibility for, and the amount
of, the benefit already earned when he reached the normal retire
ment age of sixty-five. ss As the benefit provided was reasonably re
lated to the test applied, little difficulty was experienced. The impact
of an impairment on work capacity could be judged against the long
work history required to establish the insured status being frozen.
Problems have arisen because the benefits provided have be
come divorced from the original requirement that there be a long
connection with the labor force prior to payment of benefits. The
"freeze" was augmented in 1956 with provision for payment of cash
benefits to disabled workers who had reached age fifty and to the
adult children of eligible workers who became "disabled" before age
eighteen. 56 In 1960, payment of benefits to workers of all ages was
added along with reductions in the requirement that there have been
recent long connection with the labor force. S7 Further dilution in the
program occurred in 1965. The earlier requirement that the impair
ment be of "long and indefinite duration" was liberalized to provide
for payment of benefits when the impairment was expected to last
only twelve months or result in death.s8 Payments were also permit
ted to blind workers who because of their youth had only minimal
connection with the labor force. S9 The limitation of this provision to
the blind was deleted in 1968. 60
This extension of benefits to claimants with only marginal con
nection to the labor force was only one of the ways in which the 90th
Congress demonstrated its ambivalance toward the purposes of the
disability program. On the one hand it affirmed that disability was
not an addition to the unemployment programs by rejecting the
"hire-ability" standard which had become increasingly popular with
55. fd. § 106, 68 Stat. 1079.
56. Social Security Act Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 880, §§ 101 & 103, 1956
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS (70 Stat.) 942-45, 952-63.
57. Social Security Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924
(1960) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». See section
401(a) of the amendments, id 74 Stat. 967 ("[Ellimination of requirement of attainment
of age fifty for disability insurance benefits in certain cases."), and section 404(a), id. 74
Stat. 970 ("Special insured status test in certain cases for disability purposes.").
58. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 303(a), 79 Stat.
286,366-67, (1965) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
59. fd., § 344(a), (b), 79 Stat. 412-13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(3)(8) (1976».
60. Social Security Act Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821
(1968) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981». Section
105(a) provides coverage for "younger disabled workers." fd., 81 Stat. 833.
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the courts,61 leading. for example, to a district court reversal rate of
almost thirty-five percent in fiscal year 1965.62 The new standard
required that the claimant be:
not only unable to do his previous work but [also) considering his
age, education, and work experience, [be unable to) engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. 63

On the other hand payments were added for those who had no prior
connection with the labor force: widows aged fifty to fifty-nine. The
problems with adjudicating these claims was to some extent amelio
rated by requiring that they meet an "objective" standard of disabil
ity in the form of a listed impairment. Congress also sought to affirm
its faith in the medical profession by making explicit the requirement
that disability be established by "anatomical, physiological, or psy
chological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically ac
ceptable clinical and laboratory techniques."64 These amendments
aided the reduction in district court reversals to less than twelve per
cent by fiscal year 1977.6S
The definition of eligibility was completely divorced from real
ity by its 1974 application in the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program to those who by definition had little or no connection
with the labor market.66 The ultimate absurdity has been the at
tempt to apply this standard to the SSI childhood disability program
in which a child can be adjudicated "disabled" on its day of birth.67
The nightmare of picking out which basinette contains the infants
capable of substantial gainful activity despite their self evident
clinical status must haunt everyone in the program. Not surpris
ingly, district court reversal rates climbed to almost twenty-five per
cent by fiscal year 1981.68
The addition of the SSI disability programs to the Social Secur
61. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE
CoNG. AD. NEWS 2834, 2880-2883.
62. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 1979, supra note 40, at 36.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1976).
64. Id § 423(d)(3).
65. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS, Sept. 30, 1979, supra note 40, at 36.
66. H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4989.
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1983).
68. OPERATIONAL REPORT, Sept. 30, 1982, supra note 27, at 27. While the rever
sals decreased three percent in fiscal year 1982, the remands increased 13.6%. Id
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ity Administration's caseload was not the result of careful social en
gineering, but a political accident. This program is the carcass of a
failed attempt to create a guaranteed annual income during the
Nixon Administration. As originally conceived, the program dealt
chiefly with the aid to families with dependent children program and
the debate centered on this aspect of the bill even though it was
eventually dropped from the conference committee report. 69
The problems produced by state administration of the grant-in
aid programs had created a demand for federal administration. The
problems included mushrooming costs to state government when
federal regulations invalidated state attempts to hold down eligibility
and a perceived unfairness and uneveness in state administration.
Transfer to federal administration was politically appealing because
it immediately relieved the state treasuries and because federal ad
ministration, as exemplified by the Social Security Administration,
was thought to be less judgmental and thus less demeaning to the
claimant population. 70 The impact has been the opposite of what
was desired. The image of the Social Security Administration has
been tarnished without any noticeable improvement in the quality of
the relationship between the dependent claimants and the govern
ment. The conclusion to be reached from this is that the reputation
of the Administration had been built on the sound basis of an easily
administerable retirement program, not on a unique form of internal
organization.
In creating the SSI program, Congress simply made the existing
definition of disability applicable to the new group of claimants. 71
There is no indication that any thought was given to whether it was
appropriate to apply a standard which had developed meaning
based on its application to claimants with a work background to
claimants who almost by definition had never worked. Nor did the
Social Security Administration have prior experience with the appli
cation of a "means" test designed to separate the "needy" from those
with the "means" to maintain an adequate standard of living. Hav
ing determined that a claimant is in need, human administrators
may have some difficulty in denying benefits to a claimant because
he has the theoretical capacity for a hypothetical job. Faced with a
vague statute combining conflicting social goals, the Social Security
69. See generally D.
( 1973).
70.
CONGo &

71.

MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME

H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d
AD. NEWS 4989-94, 5144-82.

Id at 5013.

Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
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Administration has produced uneven adjudication. At least with the
disability program as originally drafted, the Administration had a
benchmark of past employment to judge the impact of illness on
work capacity. With the newer programs, it became ever more diffi
cult to separate the economic and sociological causes of unemploy
ment from the medical causes. Decisionmakers were faced with
claimants who had worked despite profound medical problems and
those who had never worked because of medical problems so subtle
as to defy detection.
The problem here is two-fold: I) Our economy does not pro
vide work to all or even require all to work; and 2) short of coma and
death, there are no clinical or laboratory findings that are invariably
associated the incapacity to perform gainful activity.
As to the first point, Mashaw repeatedly concedes that it is diffi
cult to distinguish between the unemployed and the disabled. He
observes that the Act is ambivalent on the point, providing that the
program is only concerned with the "inability" to perform, not the
practical availability of work, while also considering age, education
and past work experience, factors manifestly related only to "em
ployability" rather than capacity.72 But Mashaw does not berate
Congress for its ambiguity: "[T]here is in these remarks no neces
sary criticism of the legislative mandate. Social policy as legisla
tively crafted into programmatic directives should not be expected to
emerge as a set of fully coherent approaches to unitary goals."73
As to the second matter, the lack of scientific measures of the
capacity for gainful activity, Mashaw recognizes the difficulty in as
sociating any particular facts with a claimant's capacity to contribute
to society.74 He fails to understand that the difficulty is practical im
possibility. "The realization that the ideal of instrumentally rational
administration cannot be achieved does not justify a resigned cyni
cism, however, only a more balanced idealism. Our normative ques
tions need only take account of a complex and compromised
reality."7s
Mashaw goes on to propose that because it is possible to reach
agreement on cases at the extremes-the healthy and the dead-that
it is also possible to make correct determinations in between, if we
are willing to pay enough in money and social disruption to obtain
72. J. MASHAW, supra note 6, at 53-56.
73. Id at 55.
74. Id at 63-64.
75. Id at 78.
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the necessary information. 76 The problem is merely deciding when
the degree of error becomes too expensive to eliminate. 77 It is this
assumption that misleads Mashaw. A problem such as identifying
whether a claimant is eligible for retirement benefits is amenable to
this analysis. The issues are factual: whether the claimant is sixty
five years old and whether he has the requisite insured status. If one
restricts the investigation of eligibility to asking the claimant for in
formation to determine whether he qualifies, there will be a certain
margin of error. This margin may be reduced by spending more and
more effort on investigation. For example, the Social Security Ad
ministration may require that the claimant produce a birth certifi
cate; it may inquire of the bureau of vital statistics as to the validity
of the certificate; or it may investigate whether the records of the
bureau are accurate and so forth to a point of diminishing return.
No amount of investigation will reduce the margin of error in
making disability determinations. Despite the Congressional admo
nition that the determinations rest on "objective" evidence, disability
determinations are inherently subjective. There can be no agree
ment on what it means to be "unable" to perform substantial gainful
activity as there are no medical measures of work capacity.78
The error in Mashaw's analysis is graphically presented at page
eighty-three of the text. The graph attempts to demonstrate that
there is a point at which the marginal utility of more refined analysis
of a claimant's disability reaches zero. The graph shows a straight
line relationship between a variety of factors. 79 Professor Mashaw
(and everyone else with a sense of humor) should consider Martin
Gardner's analysis of the Laffer curve in light of "technosnarl".80
We do not know that a straight line connects the extremes and we do
not know whether there is a measureable distance between those ob
viously disabled and those who are obviously able. The distance is
likely to be very small and the mathematical function that describes
the curve is beyond comprehension. This accounts for the conclu
sions of several studies, including those cited by Mashaw, that
trained disability examiners asked to adjudicate a sample of cases
76. Id at 79.
11. Id at 80.
78. See generally R.

DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE: A
PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION (1973). This book updates and expands on an

earlier article: Dixon, The We!fare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from the Social
Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681.
79. J. MASHAW, SIIpra note 6, at 83.
80. Gardner, Mathematical Games: The Laffer Curve and other laughs in current
economics, 1981 SCI. AM., Dec. 18.
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may in fact find approximately the same percentage of claimants dis
abled but will not agree as to which claimants are disabled or the
severity of their disabilities. 81
A case in point is a poster that was ubiquitous in the author's
journeys through New York City as a law student. The advertise
ment featured a picture of a quadraplegic, confined to his wheel
chair. His only method of control was a stick held in his teeth: the
quintessential disablee. The caption: "COMPUTER PROGRAM
MER-I got my job through the New York Times." The examples
are everywhere. Our former offices required that claimants be es
corted to their hearings by an elevator operator who was a diabetic
paraplegic. When these individuals, who have established their ca
pacity for gainful activity despite profound impairments in capacity,
are compared with those who are entitled to benefits because of deaf
ness, dependent personality disorder, anxiety, or alcoholism, the in
herent difficulty in determining what truly constitutes a disability is
made plain. 82
It is submitted that no system, whether designed by bureaucrats,
experts, lawyers or priests, can give a satisfactory definition to the
disability program embodied in the present Social Security Act. Be
cause the program was accreted and not designed, the risk being as
sumed for the individual by the government is unclear. If it is the
simple risk of indigency, what purpose is served by categoricallimi
tations? If it is the risk of illness, why tie the program to capacity for
hypothetical gainful activity. If it is the risk of unemployment, why
tie the program to illness? The conflict in these aims and the impos
sibility of finding an objective measure of human capacity are the
source of the program's problems, not its method of administration.
Any attempts to draw conclusions about the ideal design for a bu
reaucracy drawn from such a program are inherently flawed.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

While Mashaw describes the problems of managing the disabil
ity program in exquisite detail, he insists that the process which pro
duced them is basically sound and can be improved by reduction in
the degree of judicial interference in the bureaucratic process. Can
these problems be cured by eliminating or curtailing the role of ad
ministrative law in the adjudication of disability claims? Is the Social
81. See R. DIXON, supra note 80, at 689,710, describing studies by Saad Nagi, I.
Goldsborough and others.
82. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1501-404.1599 and Appendix 1 (1983).
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Security Administration's lawless adjudication process a model for
other agencies to emulate? Surely not. Bad cases make bad law.
The inherent flaws in the disability program explain why the ac
cepted concepts of adminjstrative law have been abandoned by the
Social Security Administration. Administrative law requires that
statutory interpretations by the bureaucracy be tested in one of two
ways: regulations must be first published and subject to public com
ment,8) and adjudications must be subject to review by an independ
ent administrative law judge. 84 These procedures add to the fairness
of administration by leaving the system open to consideration of new
or unique factors not contemplated by the legislature or by the pro
fessional bureaucracy. When, as in the disability program, there are
no clear standards, the system collapses. Every case is unique. None
are clearly right, none clearly wrong and every decision displeases
someone. Under these circumstances, the public perception of un
fairness will not be cured by curtailing the use of administrative law
which gives voice to the public's concern. It was not administrative
law which created these concerns. A program which claims to fulfill
an enlightened and benevolent society's obligations to its citizens
cannot disappoint those expectations and be non-controversial. The
disappointed unemployed who maintain the rudimentary capacity to
contribute to the economy are no less hungry or in need of shelter
and medical care. They are no less deserving and are indistinguish
able from those who have managed to convince someone in the So
cial Security Administration of their eligibility. More importantly,
they know that they are no less deserving or different from those who
have been given access to the benefits of disability. They will not be
satisfied with restructuring of the bureaucracy. What is needed is a
rethinking of the appropriate solution to the social problems the dis
ability program was intended to redress. Categorical programs, par
ticularly those with elastic concepts like "disability" cannot solve
these problems. Mashaw is simply wrong in suggesting the contrary:
The legislative standard for disability benefits is obviously the
problem. And its reform is just as obviously not the solution-at
least in a world having the expressed political preferences of the
one we live in. To be sure, the disability judgement can be made
less poignant by the addition of a negative tax or demogrant sys
tem, or by including benefits for partial disability. But these
moves do not make the decisions cognitively less difficult; the lat
83.
84.

5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
5 U.S.c. § 554 (1982).
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ter may, indeed, make them more complex. 8s

The vision here is small. The solution is reform: not reform of
the bureaucracy which will always have human failings best handled
by the tried and true concepts of administrative law; not the reform
of the disability program in a way which will continue to distinguish
between the deserving and undeserving on the basis of an ephemeral
search for the truly scientific measure of human capacity. The solu
tion is a universal program which assures employment, medical care,
housing and food to all citizens not because they have proved them
selves deserving or unable to support themselves, but because society
as a whole benefits by not having unemployed, unhealthy, ill-fed and
ill-housed citizens who are a source of discontent, disease, and crime.
Most importantly, society as a whole benefits when it does not place
individuals in the position of proving their inability or uselessness in
order to receive food, shelter and health care. The disability pro
gram is neither healthy for citizens, society or administrative law
yers. All would benefit from a program which encourages workers
to use their residual capacities rather than hide them lest they be
penalized. Administrative law cannot solve the weaknesses of the
disability program but may well be destroyed by it, if we follow the
path Mashaw suggests.

85.

J.

MASHAW,

supra note 6, at 185.

